Kieler Militia Supply is here to educate the masses on their rights and help shed light on firearms. We are here to support the "Unorganized Militia" and "Organized Militia". --“I ask who are the militia? They consist now of the whole people, except a few public officers.” – George Mason, Address to the Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 4, 1788

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Wednesday, November 17, 2021

I'm tired of Looters and Rioters Destroying People's Livelihoods.


 I'm tired of Looters and Rioters Destroying People's Livelihoods. We watched our country destroyed. Innocent businesses destroyed. When those businesses shutdown and don't come back that not only the affects the owner(s), but also all it's employees that just got laid off. That impacts their ability to provide for their families. That impacts their children and everyone in the community. In my opinion it should be the stance of this state that if you attack people and property that isn't yours you should forfeit your right to not get shot. 

Maybe it's time for Wisconsin to bring a little Texas Law to Wisconsin Law books. 

In Texas you can use deadly force to protect your property. 

Source: https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/SOTWDocs/PE/htm/PE.9.htm

PENAL CODE


TITLE 2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY


CHAPTER 9. JUSTIFICATION EXCLUDING CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY


SUBCHAPTER A. GENERAL PROVISIONS


Sec. 9.01. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter:

(1) "Custody" has the meaning assigned by Section 38.01.

(2) "Escape" has the meaning assigned by Section 38.01.

(3) "Deadly force" means force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury.

(4) "Habitation" has the meaning assigned by Section 30.01.

(5) "Vehicle" has the meaning assigned by Section 30.01.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 293, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1997.

Amended by:

Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1 (S.B. 378), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2007.

Sec. 9.02. JUSTIFICATION AS A DEFENSE. It is a defense to prosecution that the conduct in question is justified under this chapter.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.03. CONFINEMENT AS JUSTIFIABLE FORCE. Confinement is justified when force is justified by this chapter if the actor takes reasonable measures to terminate the confinement as soon as he knows he safely can unless the person confined has been arrested for an offense.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.04. THREATS AS JUSTIFIABLE FORCE. The threat of force is justified when the use of force is justified by this chapter. For purposes of this section, a threat to cause death or serious bodily injury by the production of a weapon or otherwise, as long as the actor's purpose is limited to creating an apprehension that he will use deadly force if necessary, does not constitute the use of deadly force.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.05. RECKLESS INJURY OF INNOCENT THIRD PERSON. Even though an actor is justified under this chapter in threatening or using force or deadly force against another, if in doing so he also recklessly injures or kills an innocent third person, the justification afforded by this chapter is unavailable in a prosecution for the reckless injury or killing of the innocent third person.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.06. CIVIL REMEDIES UNAFFECTED. The fact that conduct is justified under this chapter does not abolish or impair any remedy for the conduct that is available in a civil suit.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

SUBCHAPTER B. JUSTIFICATION GENERALLY


Sec. 9.21. PUBLIC DUTY. (a) Except as qualified by Subsections (b) and (c), conduct is justified if the actor reasonably believes the conduct is required or authorized by law, by the judgment or order of a competent court or other governmental tribunal, or in the execution of legal process.

(b) The other sections of this chapter control when force is used against a person to protect persons (Subchapter C), to protect property (Subchapter D), for law enforcement (Subchapter E), or by virtue of a special relationship (Subchapter F).

(c) The use of deadly force is not justified under this section unless the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is specifically required by statute or unless it occurs in the lawful conduct of war. If deadly force is so justified, there is no duty to retreat before using it.

(d) The justification afforded by this section is available if the actor reasonably believes:

(1) the court or governmental tribunal has jurisdiction or the process is lawful, even though the court or governmental tribunal lacks jurisdiction or the process is unlawful; or

(2) his conduct is required or authorized to assist a public servant in the performance of his official duty, even though the servant exceeds his lawful authority.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.22. NECESSITY. Conduct is justified if:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct is immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm;

(2) the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly outweigh, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the conduct; and

(3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed for the conduct does not otherwise plainly appear.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

SUBCHAPTER C. PROTECTION OF PERSONS


Sec. 9.31. SELF-DEFENSE. (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force. The actor's belief that the force was immediately necessary as described by this subsection is presumed to be reasonable if the actor:

(1) knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom the force was used:

(A) unlawfully and with force entered, or was attempting to enter unlawfully and with force, the actor's occupied habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment;

(B) unlawfully and with force removed, or was attempting to remove unlawfully and with force, the actor from the actor's habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment; or

(C) was committing or attempting to commit aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery;

(2) did not provoke the person against whom the force was used; and

(3) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or ordinance regulating traffic at the time the force was used.

(b) The use of force against another is not justified:

(1) in response to verbal provocation alone;

(2) to resist an arrest or search that the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, or by a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, even though the arrest or search is unlawful, unless the resistance is justified under Subsection (c);

(3) if the actor consented to the exact force used or attempted by the other;

(4) if the actor provoked the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force, unless:

(A) the actor abandons the encounter, or clearly communicates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he cannot safely abandon the encounter; and

(B) the other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful force against the actor; or

(5) if the actor sought an explanation from or discussion with the other person concerning the actor's differences with the other person while the actor was:

(A) carrying a weapon in violation of Section 46.02; or

(B) possessing or transporting a weapon in violation of Section 46.05.

(c) The use of force to resist an arrest or search is justified:

(1) if, before the actor offers any resistance, the peace officer (or person acting at his direction) uses or attempts to use greater force than necessary to make the arrest or search; and

(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the peace officer's (or other person's) use or attempted use of greater force than necessary.

(d) The use of deadly force is not justified under this subchapter except as provided in Sections 9.32, 9.33, and 9.34.

(e) A person who has a right to be present at the location where the force is used, who has not provoked the person against whom the force is used, and who is not engaged in criminal activity at the time the force is used is not required to retreat before using force as described by this section.

(f) For purposes of Subsection (a), in determining whether an actor described by Subsection (e) reasonably believed that the use of force was necessary, a finder of fact may not consider whether the actor failed to retreat.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 190, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1995.

Amended by:

Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1 (S.B. 378), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2007.

Sec. 9.32. DEADLY FORCE IN DEFENSE OF PERSON. (a) A person is justified in using deadly force against another:

(1) if the actor would be justified in using force against the other under Section 9.31; and

(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary:

(A) to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or

(B) to prevent the other's imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery.

(b) The actor's belief under Subsection (a)(2) that the deadly force was immediately necessary as described by that subdivision is presumed to be reasonable if the actor:

(1) knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom the deadly force was used:

(A) unlawfully and with force entered, or was attempting to enter unlawfully and with force, the actor's occupied habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment;

(B) unlawfully and with force removed, or was attempting to remove unlawfully and with force, the actor from the actor's habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment; or

(C) was committing or attempting to commit an offense described by Subsection (a)(2)(B);

(2) did not provoke the person against whom the force was used; and

(3) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or ordinance regulating traffic at the time the force was used.

(c) A person who has a right to be present at the location where the deadly force is used, who has not provoked the person against whom the deadly force is used, and who is not engaged in criminal activity at the time the deadly force is used is not required to retreat before using deadly force as described by this section.

(d) For purposes of Subsection (a)(2), in determining whether an actor described by Subsection (c) reasonably believed that the use of deadly force was necessary, a finder of fact may not consider whether the actor failed to retreat.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 5316, ch. 977, Sec. 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1983; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 235, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1995.

Amended by:

Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1 (S.B. 378), Sec. 3, eff. September 1, 2007.

Sec. 9.33. DEFENSE OF THIRD PERSON. A person is justified in using force or deadly force against another to protect a third person if:

(1) under the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be, the actor would be justified under Section 9.31 or 9.32 in using force or deadly force to protect himself against the unlawful force or unlawful deadly force he reasonably believes to be threatening the third person he seeks to protect; and

(2) the actor reasonably believes that his intervention is immediately necessary to protect the third person.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.34. PROTECTION OF LIFE OR HEALTH. (a) A person is justified in using force, but not deadly force, against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to prevent the other from committing suicide or inflicting serious bodily injury to himself.

(b) A person is justified in using both force and deadly force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force or deadly force is immediately necessary to preserve the other's life in an emergency.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

SUBCHAPTER D. PROTECTION OF PROPERTY


Sec. 9.41. PROTECTION OF ONE'S OWN PROPERTY. (a) A person in lawful possession of land or tangible, movable property is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on the land or unlawful interference with the property.

(b) A person unlawfully dispossessed of land or tangible, movable property by another is justified in using force against the other when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to reenter the land or recover the property if the actor uses the force immediately or in fresh pursuit after the dispossession and:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the other had no claim of right when he dispossessed the actor; or

(2) the other accomplished the dispossession by using force, threat, or fraud against the actor.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.42. DEADLY FORCE TO PROTECT PROPERTY. A person is justified in using deadly force against another to protect land or tangible, movable property:

(1) if he would be justified in using force against the other under Section 9.41; and

(2) when and to the degree he reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary:

(A) to prevent the other's imminent commission of arson, burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, theft during the nighttime, or criminal mischief during the nighttime; or

(B) to prevent the other who is fleeing immediately after committing burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, or theft during the nighttime from escaping with the property; and

(3) he reasonably believes that:

(A) the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other means; or

(B) the use of force other than deadly force to protect or recover the land or property would expose the actor or another to a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.43. PROTECTION OF THIRD PERSON'S PROPERTY. A person is justified in using force or deadly force against another to protect land or tangible, movable property of a third person if, under the circumstances as he reasonably believes them to be, the actor would be justified under Section 9.41 or 9.42 in using force or deadly force to protect his own land or property and:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the unlawful interference constitutes attempted or consummated theft of or criminal mischief to the tangible, movable property; or

(2) the actor reasonably believes that:

(A) the third person has requested his protection of the land or property;

(B) he has a legal duty to protect the third person's land or property; or

(C) the third person whose land or property he uses force or deadly force to protect is the actor's spouse, parent, or child, resides with the actor, or is under the actor's care.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.44. USE OF DEVICE TO PROTECT PROPERTY. The justification afforded by Sections 9.41 and 9.43 applies to the use of a device to protect land or tangible, movable property if:

(1) the device is not designed to cause, or known by the actor to create a substantial risk of causing, death or serious bodily injury; and

(2) use of the device is reasonable under all the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be when he installs the device.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 913, ch. 342, Sec. 6, eff. Sept. 1, 1975. Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

SUBCHAPTER E. LAW ENFORCEMENT


Sec. 9.51. ARREST AND SEARCH. (a) A peace officer, or a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to make or assist in making an arrest or search, or to prevent or assist in preventing escape after arrest, if:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the arrest or search is lawful or, if the arrest or search is made under a warrant, he reasonably believes the warrant is valid; and

(2) before using force, the actor manifests his purpose to arrest or search and identifies himself as a peace officer or as one acting at a peace officer's direction, unless he reasonably believes his purpose and identity are already known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested.

(b) A person other than a peace officer (or one acting at his direction) is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to make or assist in making a lawful arrest, or to prevent or assist in preventing escape after lawful arrest if, before using force, the actor manifests his purpose to and the reason for the arrest or reasonably believes his purpose and the reason are already known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested.

(c) A peace officer is justified in using deadly force against another when and to the degree the peace officer reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to make an arrest, or to prevent escape after arrest, if the use of force would have been justified under Subsection (a) and:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct for which arrest is authorized included the use or attempted use of deadly force; or

(2) the actor reasonably believes there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury to the actor or another if the arrest is delayed.

(d) A person other than a peace officer acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction is justified in using deadly force against another when and to the degree the person reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to make a lawful arrest, or to prevent escape after a lawful arrest, if the use of force would have been justified under Subsection (b) and:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the felony or offense against the public peace for which arrest is authorized included the use or attempted use of deadly force; or

(2) the actor reasonably believes there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury to another if the arrest is delayed.

(e) There is no duty to retreat before using deadly force justified by Subsection (c) or (d).

(f) Nothing in this section relating to the actor's manifestation of purpose or identity shall be construed as conflicting with any other law relating to the issuance, service, and execution of an arrest or search warrant either under the laws of this state or the United States.

(g) Deadly force may only be used under the circumstances enumerated in Subsections (c) and (d).

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.52. PREVENTION OF ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY. The use of force to prevent the escape of an arrested person from custody is justifiable when the force could have been employed to effect the arrest under which the person is in custody, except that a guard employed by a correctional facility or a peace officer is justified in using any force, including deadly force, that he reasonably believes to be immediately necessary to prevent the escape of a person from the correctional facility.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.53. MAINTAINING SECURITY IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY. An officer or employee of a correctional facility is justified in using force against a person in custody when and to the degree the officer or employee reasonably believes the force is necessary to maintain the security of the correctional facility, the safety or security of other persons in custody or employed by the correctional facility, or his own safety or security.

Added by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 512, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1987. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.54. LIMITATION ON USE OF FORCE BY DRONE. (a) In this section:

(1) "Autonomous drone" means a drone that operates autonomously through computer software or other programming.

(2) "Drone" and "law enforcement agency" have the meanings assigned by Article 2.33, Code of Criminal Procedure.

(b) Notwithstanding any other law, the use of force, including deadly force, involving a drone is justified under this subchapter only if:

(1) at the time the use of force occurred, the actor was employed by a law enforcement agency;

(2) the use of force:

(A) would have been justified under another provision of this subchapter; and

(B) did not involve the use of deadly force by means of an autonomous drone; and

(3) before the use of force occurred, the law enforcement agency employing the actor adopted and submitted to the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement a policy on the agency's use of force by means of a drone, as required by Article 2.33, Code of Criminal Procedure, and the use of force conformed to the requirements of that policy.

Added by Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1011 (H.B. 1758), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2021.

SUBCHAPTER F. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS


Sec. 9.61. PARENT-CHILD. (a) The use of force, but not deadly force, against a child younger than 18 years is justified:

(1) if the actor is the child's parent or stepparent or is acting in loco parentis to the child; and

(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is necessary to discipline the child or to safeguard or promote his welfare.

(b) For purposes of this section, "in loco parentis" includes grandparent and guardian, any person acting by, through, or under the direction of a court with jurisdiction over the child, and anyone who has express or implied consent of the parent or parents.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.62. EDUCATOR-STUDENT. The use of force, but not deadly force, against a person is justified:

(1) if the actor is entrusted with the care, supervision, or administration of the person for a special purpose; and

(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is necessary to further the special purpose or to maintain discipline in a group.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.63. GUARDIAN-INCOMPETENT. The use of force, but not deadly force, against a mental incompetent is justified:

(1) if the actor is the incompetent's guardian or someone similarly responsible for the general care and supervision of the incompetent; and

(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is necessary:

(A) to safeguard and promote the incompetent's welfare; or

(B) if the incompetent is in an institution for his care and custody, to maintain discipline in the institution.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Second Source: https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/SOTWDocs/PE/htm/PE.9.htm

PENAL CODE


TITLE 2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY


CHAPTER 9. JUSTIFICATION EXCLUDING CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY


SUBCHAPTER A. GENERAL PROVISIONS


Sec. 9.01. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter:

(1) "Custody" has the meaning assigned by Section 38.01.

(2) "Escape" has the meaning assigned by Section 38.01.

(3) "Deadly force" means force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury.

(4) "Habitation" has the meaning assigned by Section 30.01.

(5) "Vehicle" has the meaning assigned by Section 30.01.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 293, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1997.

Amended by:

Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1 (S.B. 378), Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 2007.

Sec. 9.02. JUSTIFICATION AS A DEFENSE. It is a defense to prosecution that the conduct in question is justified under this chapter.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.03. CONFINEMENT AS JUSTIFIABLE FORCE. Confinement is justified when force is justified by this chapter if the actor takes reasonable measures to terminate the confinement as soon as he knows he safely can unless the person confined has been arrested for an offense.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.04. THREATS AS JUSTIFIABLE FORCE. The threat of force is justified when the use of force is justified by this chapter. For purposes of this section, a threat to cause death or serious bodily injury by the production of a weapon or otherwise, as long as the actor's purpose is limited to creating an apprehension that he will use deadly force if necessary, does not constitute the use of deadly force.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.05. RECKLESS INJURY OF INNOCENT THIRD PERSON. Even though an actor is justified under this chapter in threatening or using force or deadly force against another, if in doing so he also recklessly injures or kills an innocent third person, the justification afforded by this chapter is unavailable in a prosecution for the reckless injury or killing of the innocent third person.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.06. CIVIL REMEDIES UNAFFECTED. The fact that conduct is justified under this chapter does not abolish or impair any remedy for the conduct that is available in a civil suit.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

SUBCHAPTER B. JUSTIFICATION GENERALLY


Sec. 9.21. PUBLIC DUTY. (a) Except as qualified by Subsections (b) and (c), conduct is justified if the actor reasonably believes the conduct is required or authorized by law, by the judgment or order of a competent court or other governmental tribunal, or in the execution of legal process.

(b) The other sections of this chapter control when force is used against a person to protect persons (Subchapter C), to protect property (Subchapter D), for law enforcement (Subchapter E), or by virtue of a special relationship (Subchapter F).

(c) The use of deadly force is not justified under this section unless the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is specifically required by statute or unless it occurs in the lawful conduct of war. If deadly force is so justified, there is no duty to retreat before using it.

(d) The justification afforded by this section is available if the actor reasonably believes:

(1) the court or governmental tribunal has jurisdiction or the process is lawful, even though the court or governmental tribunal lacks jurisdiction or the process is unlawful; or

(2) his conduct is required or authorized to assist a public servant in the performance of his official duty, even though the servant exceeds his lawful authority.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.22. NECESSITY. Conduct is justified if:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct is immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm;

(2) the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly outweigh, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the conduct; and

(3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed for the conduct does not otherwise plainly appear.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

SUBCHAPTER C. PROTECTION OF PERSONS


Sec. 9.31. SELF-DEFENSE. (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b), a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force. The actor's belief that the force was immediately necessary as described by this subsection is presumed to be reasonable if the actor:

(1) knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom the force was used:

(A) unlawfully and with force entered, or was attempting to enter unlawfully and with force, the actor's occupied habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment;

(B) unlawfully and with force removed, or was attempting to remove unlawfully and with force, the actor from the actor's habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment; or

(C) was committing or attempting to commit aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery;

(2) did not provoke the person against whom the force was used; and

(3) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or ordinance regulating traffic at the time the force was used.

(b) The use of force against another is not justified:

(1) in response to verbal provocation alone;

(2) to resist an arrest or search that the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, or by a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, even though the arrest or search is unlawful, unless the resistance is justified under Subsection (c);

(3) if the actor consented to the exact force used or attempted by the other;

(4) if the actor provoked the other's use or attempted use of unlawful force, unless:

(A) the actor abandons the encounter, or clearly communicates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he cannot safely abandon the encounter; and

(B) the other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful force against the actor; or

(5) if the actor sought an explanation from or discussion with the other person concerning the actor's differences with the other person while the actor was:

(A) carrying a weapon in violation of Section 46.02; or

(B) possessing or transporting a weapon in violation of Section 46.05.

(c) The use of force to resist an arrest or search is justified:

(1) if, before the actor offers any resistance, the peace officer (or person acting at his direction) uses or attempts to use greater force than necessary to make the arrest or search; and

(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the peace officer's (or other person's) use or attempted use of greater force than necessary.

(d) The use of deadly force is not justified under this subchapter except as provided in Sections 9.32, 9.33, and 9.34.

(e) A person who has a right to be present at the location where the force is used, who has not provoked the person against whom the force is used, and who is not engaged in criminal activity at the time the force is used is not required to retreat before using force as described by this section.

(f) For purposes of Subsection (a), in determining whether an actor described by Subsection (e) reasonably believed that the use of force was necessary, a finder of fact may not consider whether the actor failed to retreat.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 190, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1995.

Amended by:

Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1 (S.B. 378), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2007.

Sec. 9.32. DEADLY FORCE IN DEFENSE OF PERSON. (a) A person is justified in using deadly force against another:

(1) if the actor would be justified in using force against the other under Section 9.31; and

(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary:

(A) to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or

(B) to prevent the other's imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery.

(b) The actor's belief under Subsection (a)(2) that the deadly force was immediately necessary as described by that subdivision is presumed to be reasonable if the actor:

(1) knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom the deadly force was used:

(A) unlawfully and with force entered, or was attempting to enter unlawfully and with force, the actor's occupied habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment;

(B) unlawfully and with force removed, or was attempting to remove unlawfully and with force, the actor from the actor's habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment; or

(C) was committing or attempting to commit an offense described by Subsection (a)(2)(B);

(2) did not provoke the person against whom the force was used; and

(3) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or ordinance regulating traffic at the time the force was used.

(c) A person who has a right to be present at the location where the deadly force is used, who has not provoked the person against whom the deadly force is used, and who is not engaged in criminal activity at the time the deadly force is used is not required to retreat before using deadly force as described by this section.

(d) For purposes of Subsection (a)(2), in determining whether an actor described by Subsection (c) reasonably believed that the use of deadly force was necessary, a finder of fact may not consider whether the actor failed to retreat.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1983, 68th Leg., p. 5316, ch. 977, Sec. 5, eff. Sept. 1, 1983; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 235, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1995.

Amended by:

Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1 (S.B. 378), Sec. 3, eff. September 1, 2007.

Sec. 9.33. DEFENSE OF THIRD PERSON. A person is justified in using force or deadly force against another to protect a third person if:

(1) under the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be, the actor would be justified under Section 9.31 or 9.32 in using force or deadly force to protect himself against the unlawful force or unlawful deadly force he reasonably believes to be threatening the third person he seeks to protect; and

(2) the actor reasonably believes that his intervention is immediately necessary to protect the third person.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.34. PROTECTION OF LIFE OR HEALTH. (a) A person is justified in using force, but not deadly force, against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to prevent the other from committing suicide or inflicting serious bodily injury to himself.

(b) A person is justified in using both force and deadly force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force or deadly force is immediately necessary to preserve the other's life in an emergency.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

SUBCHAPTER D. PROTECTION OF PROPERTY


Sec. 9.41. PROTECTION OF ONE'S OWN PROPERTY. (a) A person in lawful possession of land or tangible, movable property is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on the land or unlawful interference with the property.

(b) A person unlawfully dispossessed of land or tangible, movable property by another is justified in using force against the other when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to reenter the land or recover the property if the actor uses the force immediately or in fresh pursuit after the dispossession and:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the other had no claim of right when he dispossessed the actor; or

(2) the other accomplished the dispossession by using force, threat, or fraud against the actor.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.42. DEADLY FORCE TO PROTECT PROPERTY. A person is justified in using deadly force against another to protect land or tangible, movable property:

(1) if he would be justified in using force against the other under Section 9.41; and

(2) when and to the degree he reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary:

(A) to prevent the other's imminent commission of arson, burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, theft during the nighttime, or criminal mischief during the nighttime; or

(B) to prevent the other who is fleeing immediately after committing burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, or theft during the nighttime from escaping with the property; and

(3) he reasonably believes that:

(A) the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other means; or

(B) the use of force other than deadly force to protect or recover the land or property would expose the actor or another to a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.43. PROTECTION OF THIRD PERSON'S PROPERTY. A person is justified in using force or deadly force against another to protect land or tangible, movable property of a third person if, under the circumstances as he reasonably believes them to be, the actor would be justified under Section 9.41 or 9.42 in using force or deadly force to protect his own land or property and:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the unlawful interference constitutes attempted or consummated theft of or criminal mischief to the tangible, movable property; or

(2) the actor reasonably believes that:

(A) the third person has requested his protection of the land or property;

(B) he has a legal duty to protect the third person's land or property; or

(C) the third person whose land or property he uses force or deadly force to protect is the actor's spouse, parent, or child, resides with the actor, or is under the actor's care.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.44. USE OF DEVICE TO PROTECT PROPERTY. The justification afforded by Sections 9.41 and 9.43 applies to the use of a device to protect land or tangible, movable property if:

(1) the device is not designed to cause, or known by the actor to create a substantial risk of causing, death or serious bodily injury; and

(2) use of the device is reasonable under all the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be when he installs the device.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 913, ch. 342, Sec. 6, eff. Sept. 1, 1975. Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

SUBCHAPTER E. LAW ENFORCEMENT


Sec. 9.51. ARREST AND SEARCH. (a) A peace officer, or a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to make or assist in making an arrest or search, or to prevent or assist in preventing escape after arrest, if:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the arrest or search is lawful or, if the arrest or search is made under a warrant, he reasonably believes the warrant is valid; and

(2) before using force, the actor manifests his purpose to arrest or search and identifies himself as a peace officer or as one acting at a peace officer's direction, unless he reasonably believes his purpose and identity are already known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested.

(b) A person other than a peace officer (or one acting at his direction) is justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to make or assist in making a lawful arrest, or to prevent or assist in preventing escape after lawful arrest if, before using force, the actor manifests his purpose to and the reason for the arrest or reasonably believes his purpose and the reason are already known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested.

(c) A peace officer is justified in using deadly force against another when and to the degree the peace officer reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to make an arrest, or to prevent escape after arrest, if the use of force would have been justified under Subsection (a) and:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct for which arrest is authorized included the use or attempted use of deadly force; or

(2) the actor reasonably believes there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury to the actor or another if the arrest is delayed.

(d) A person other than a peace officer acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction is justified in using deadly force against another when and to the degree the person reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary to make a lawful arrest, or to prevent escape after a lawful arrest, if the use of force would have been justified under Subsection (b) and:

(1) the actor reasonably believes the felony or offense against the public peace for which arrest is authorized included the use or attempted use of deadly force; or

(2) the actor reasonably believes there is a substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury to another if the arrest is delayed.

(e) There is no duty to retreat before using deadly force justified by Subsection (c) or (d).

(f) Nothing in this section relating to the actor's manifestation of purpose or identity shall be construed as conflicting with any other law relating to the issuance, service, and execution of an arrest or search warrant either under the laws of this state or the United States.

(g) Deadly force may only be used under the circumstances enumerated in Subsections (c) and (d).

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.52. PREVENTION OF ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY. The use of force to prevent the escape of an arrested person from custody is justifiable when the force could have been employed to effect the arrest under which the person is in custody, except that a guard employed by a correctional facility or a peace officer is justified in using any force, including deadly force, that he reasonably believes to be immediately necessary to prevent the escape of a person from the correctional facility.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.53. MAINTAINING SECURITY IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY. An officer or employee of a correctional facility is justified in using force against a person in custody when and to the degree the officer or employee reasonably believes the force is necessary to maintain the security of the correctional facility, the safety or security of other persons in custody or employed by the correctional facility, or his own safety or security.

Added by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 512, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1987. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.54. LIMITATION ON USE OF FORCE BY DRONE. (a) In this section:

(1) "Autonomous drone" means a drone that operates autonomously through computer software or other programming.

(2) "Drone" and "law enforcement agency" have the meanings assigned by Article 2.33, Code of Criminal Procedure.

(b) Notwithstanding any other law, the use of force, including deadly force, involving a drone is justified under this subchapter only if:

(1) at the time the use of force occurred, the actor was employed by a law enforcement agency;

(2) the use of force:

(A) would have been justified under another provision of this subchapter; and

(B) did not involve the use of deadly force by means of an autonomous drone; and

(3) before the use of force occurred, the law enforcement agency employing the actor adopted and submitted to the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement a policy on the agency's use of force by means of a drone, as required by Article 2.33, Code of Criminal Procedure, and the use of force conformed to the requirements of that policy.

Added by Acts 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., Ch. 1011 (H.B. 1758), Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2021.

SUBCHAPTER F. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS


Sec. 9.61. PARENT-CHILD. (a) The use of force, but not deadly force, against a child younger than 18 years is justified:

(1) if the actor is the child's parent or stepparent or is acting in loco parentis to the child; and

(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is necessary to discipline the child or to safeguard or promote his welfare.

(b) For purposes of this section, "in loco parentis" includes grandparent and guardian, any person acting by, through, or under the direction of a court with jurisdiction over the child, and anyone who has express or implied consent of the parent or parents.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.62. EDUCATOR-STUDENT. The use of force, but not deadly force, against a person is justified:

(1) if the actor is entrusted with the care, supervision, or administration of the person for a special purpose; and

(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is necessary to further the special purpose or to maintain discipline in a group.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Sec. 9.63. GUARDIAN-INCOMPETENT. The use of force, but not deadly force, against a mental incompetent is justified:

(1) if the actor is the incompetent's guardian or someone similarly responsible for the general care and supervision of the incompetent; and

(2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is necessary:

(A) to safeguard and promote the incompetent's welfare; or

(B) if the incompetent is in an institution for his care and custody, to maintain discipline in the institution.

Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.

Tuesday, November 16, 2021

You don't need a permit to have a firearm in Wisconsin.

 You don't need a permit to have a firearm in Wisconsin. 

Your 2nd Amendment rights do not stop at the DNR's Hunting Regulations.

Kyle was legal to have possession of the AR15 that night.

Gun Owners of America Synopsis on the Prosecutor:

Kyle Rittenhouse's Prosecutor MAKES THE CASE FOR THE 2A


The Judge dropped the weapons charge and rightfully so. 

Kyle Rittenhouse Jury Verdict Prediction




Monday, November 15, 2021

Big Government has gotten too big. When ATF works to entrap FFL dealers

 Big Government has gotten too big. When ATF works to entrap FFL dealers

Be aware FFL dealers, this could happen to you too! In my eyes ATF has needed to go for quite some time now. Way too much red tape over the Firearm and Alcohol Industries. The NFA should be repealed immediately. 



LIVE: Jury instructions, closing arguments in Kyle Rittenhouse trial: www.wisn.com/kyle-rittenhouse

 

LIVE: Jury instructions, closing arguments in Kyle Rittenhouse trial. I would like to say Good Job to the Defense for bringing forth the Truth!!! 

Hopefully the truth sets him free, because we know the jury doesn't know about the rap sheets of the perpetrators and has some limitations on what they hear.


Prosecution Lies about Joseph Rosenbaum Pedophile, Sex Offender of 5 young children ages 9 - 11 years old, and convicted felon. Rosenbaum was bipolar.. Rosenbaum's girlfriend 


The additional people shot that night all had rap sheets as well. 

"Jump Kick Man" tried to crush Kyle's skull into the ground with his boots which could result in great bodily harm or even death. 

Also, as a kid I skateboarded and I can tell you that a skateboard can easily be used as a deadly weapon. I still stand with Kyle and agree with Colion Noir as this is Self Defense. 

I also after watching this case and feel that the state of Wisconsin should pass the same law that Texas has where you can shoot to protect your property. Especially, 

I will make it clear that Kyle was not shooting people to protect property and it was 100% self defense trying to stop an imminent threat of bodily or death to himself.

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10203911/Sole-survivor-Kyle-Rittenhouse-career-criminal-charges-dropped-just-trial.html

EXCLUSIVE: Prosecution's star witness in Kyle Rittenhouse case is a career criminal with a history of domestic abuse, prowling, trespass and burglary - but had charges DROPPED just six days before trial began and jury never learned of his past

  • Gaige Grosskreutz, 28, was shot by Kyle Rittenhouse in August 2020, and appeared as the prosecution's star witness last week  
  • DailyMail.com has learned Grosskreutz is a violent career criminal with a laundry list of prior offenses and convictions stretching back more than a decade 
  • These include domestic abuse, prowling, trespass, two DUIs, felony burglary and two charges of carrying a firearm while intoxicated 
  • Assistant District Attorney Thomas Binger was well aware of this when he paraded Grosskreutz as a paragon of selfless virtue in front of the jury 
  • Less than ten days before he was shot by Rittenhouse, Grosskreutz was arrested and charged with prowling when he was caught videotaping cops' personal cars 
  • But the Rittenhouse jury heard none of this because just six days before he took the stand, Grosskreutz's DUI charge was dismissed on a technicality  
  • Had Grosskreutz's latest DUI charge not been dismissed, Rittenhouse's defense would have been allowed to question him under oath about the offense 
Adding to this Grosskreutz lied about having firearm to police, which is obstruction of justice. Grosskreutz did not have a conceal Carry permit. Grosskreutz would not disclose his phone upon request by police. The state decides not to pursue a warrant to do so because if they do defense would have that evidence as well which wouldn't fit the states objective to screw Kyle Rittenhouse. They had a warrant to do so, but did not act on it.





Rittenhouse Weapons Charge was dropped because he did not violate Wisconsin Law.

I look forward to Kyle suing all the Slanderous Media and the President of the United States

'The Five' react to trial of Kyle Rittenhouse closing arguments



Prosecution was trying to make Anthony Huber out to be a hero but the truth couldn't be further from the truth. Take a look at this guys Criminal background. 
Acquired through Wisconsin Circuit Court System. 










Saturday, November 13, 2021

Governor Evers of Wisconsin Vetoed to Protect Election Fraud

 Governor Tony Evers of Wisconsin Vetoed to Protect Election Fraud weakening election integrity and allowing fraud to continue.

Bills Vetoed would have made elections more secure and would have made it harder for election fraud to occur. 

Source: https://www.wpr.org/gov-tony-evers-vetoes-6-gop-backed-election-bills

 bills vetoed by Tony Evers on Tuesday would have:

  • Made it a felony to falsely represent yourself as indefinitely confined or falsely affirm someone else’s indefinitely confined status. 
  • Limited communities to a single site outside the clerk’s office for absentee ballot drop-offs. 
  • Barred the Wisconsin Elections Commission from automatically sending absentee ballot applications or absentee ballots to voters.
  • Required clerks to post hourly updates with absentee voting statistics on the evening of Election Day.
  • Required administrators at nursing homes and assisted living facilities to notify families when certified voting assistants will visit their facility to help residents with voting.
  • Made it a felony for nursing home or assisted living facility staff to "influence" a resident’s voting behavior. 
  • Required observation areas for recounts to be no more than 3 feet from the area where ballots and other materials are being examined. 
  • Barred election officials from adding missing information to absentee ballot envelopes, even if they are able to get the information from official state documents. 
  • Required communities that provide live broadcasts of election proceedings to keep the recordings on file for at least 22 months. 

Republicans were quick to push back on the governor’s vetoes. In a prepared statement, Assembly Speaker Robin Vos, R-Rochester, said Evers’ moves were a "momentous mistake."

"These bills closed loopholes, standardized procedures, established uniformity, guaranteed only the voter can correct their own ballot and protected votes of seniors in long-term care," Vos said. 

Senate Majority Leader Devin LeMahieu, R-Oostburg, also issued a statement saying the governor "showed he’s committed to keeping the same laws and loopholes that were exploited during the pandemic."

"Protecting Voter ID laws and the integrity of our election is fundamental to a healthy republic," LeMahieu said. "Governor Evers is standing in the way of restoring the trust in our process that has been lost."

Sen. Duey Stroebel, R-Saukville, who sponsored three of the vetoed bills, accused the governor of playing to his political base with the vetoes.

"I am frustrated but not surprised Governor Evers ignored lessons we learned from 2020 to play to his base," Stroebel said. "It is now crystal clear to all Wisconsinites who wants to pursue common sense election integrity measures and who does not."

It is our Opinion that Governor Evers doesn't want election integrity especially in Dane and Milwaukee county as that would make it harder to steal elections. We know that people were lying about disability status to not be present in last presidential election. <--That includes pole workers violating laws. We know that WEC was just sending out willy nilly absentee ballots making it easier to harvest or steal votes. These Bills proposed would have deterred fraudulent activity and held people accountable for their actions. I ask all Wisconsin Residents to remember this when next election comes up in 2022. It's time to get rid of Evers as he was never good for Wisconsin and he's certainly chums with our current Presidential Tyrant whom is against our Bill of Rights and trying to take the people liberty and medical freedoms away.

What is happening in Wisconsin Nursing homes:




Friday, November 12, 2021

LIVE: Judge and attorneys in Kyle Rittenhouse trial meet today while the jury has the day off

 

 LIVE: Judge and attorneys in Kyle Rittenhouse trial meet today while the jury has the day off

12-NOVEMBER-2021


 

3212 Un-redacted" Probes death of Green Berets KIA

 3212 Un-redacted" Probes death of Green Berets KIA 


Pentagon Lies about Green Berets that died.
Conflicting information from Pentagon told to family members.
Pentagon Falsely accused 3212 of going on a rogue mission, which was a blatant lie and later partially corrected by issuing medals to the fallen much later.
Top Brass in the Army tried to cover up and protect themselves from owning up to failures and accountability while passing blame to someone who had no involvement in the failures.

MAJ Alan VAN SAUN stated,
"ODA 3212 was trained and certified and validated by Lieutenant Colonel Painter and Colonel Moses."

Maj Alan Van Saun had his career wrongfully and prematurely ended.

Mission videos shared and un-redacted reports now shared. 

This is a MUST WATCH on HULU full story. Search "3212 Un-Redacted"

If you're looking to support Green Berets and their families consider donating to the
Green Beret Foundation. 





Thursday, November 11, 2021

Wednesday, November 10, 2021

Continuation of Kyle Rittenhouse Self-defense Trial. Wed 10 Nov 2021

 Continuation of Kyle Rittenhouse Self-defense Trial. 

Prosecution ADA tries to cause a mistrial. 

Continues to go against the court and Weisel around the defendant's constitutional rights.










Kyle Rittenhouse Self Defense Trial Continuation.

 Kyle Rittenhouse Self Defense Trial Continuation.

I'm loving this judge. You clearly see from the questioning from the ADA prosecution that he's a Biden Voter. LOL


My questions for the day.

Why was ATF and FBI harassing witnesses? Why were they there to begin with? No one is asking why they had a plane or drone in the air in the media? 

I think it's about time to disband FBI and replace them with a new agency. 

What I see out of this trial is an innocent man being attacked for political means. Clearly the ADA  is against the 2nd Amendment based off his line of questioning or ignores the true meaning and reasoning of the 2nd Amendment. Why does the type of firearm used matter in a self-defense case? ADA keeps asking and mentioning the use of an AR15 instead of actually doing his job. His case against Kyle from what I see is a waste of taxpayers money and time. What a bunch of tools. Firearm used means nothing who could have had a 50 cal and still doesn't matter because of justified use of deadly force. Seems ADA is trying to pull Political strings in the Jurors because he has no real case. 

Saturday, November 6, 2021

Episode 240: A STRIKE AT THE HEART

 Episode 240: A STRIKE AT THE HEART


D.C. Panel Highlights Vaccine Injuries; CDC Approves Covid Shot for Kids; Conflicting Data on Myocarditis in Kids; America Stages Walkout

GUESTS: Brianne Dressen, Peter McCullough MD, Leigh Dundas, Esq.

Senator Ron Johnson brings forward Covid 19 Vaccine Injured  people who have had their lives destroyed.

FDA PUBLIC HEARING SESSION RECORDING DISCLOSED

13 Republicans that voted for Democrat Infrastructure Bill




Source: https://resistthemainstream.org/here-are-the-13-republicans-who-voted-with-democrats-to-pass-infrastructure-bill-after-months-of-negotiations/?utm_source=newsletter2 

Don Bacon of Nebraska, 

Brian Fitzpatrick of Pennsylvania, 

Andrew Garbarino of New York, 

Anthony Gonzalez of Ohio, 

John Katko of New York, 

Adam Kinzinger of Illinois, 

Nicole Malliotakis of New York, 

David McKinley of West Virginia, 

Tom Reed of New York, 

Chris Smith of New Jersey, 

Fred Upton of Michigan, 

Jeff van Drew of New Jersey 

Don Young of Alaska.






Tuesday, November 2, 2021

George Soros Financing Corruption

 George Soros Financing Corruption. George Soros moving 18 Billion Dollars to sway government elected positions. Not a conspiracy, but a Fact!!! This is what these Billionaires do. They make fancy nice foundations to protect themselves and to attempt to hide their activities.



LIVESTREAM: Kyle Rittenhouse Trial Opening Arguments! | Louder with Crowder

 LIVESTREAM: Kyle Rittenhouse Trial Opening Arguments! | Louder with Crowder

Unseen Footage enclosed. 


Full LIVE: Opening Arguments





NBC Reporter Calls Secret Service Over PSA's Let's Go Brandon AR Lowers

😂😂😂😂😂😂😂😆😆😆

NBC Reporter Calls Secret Service Over PSA's Let's Go Brandon AR Lowers









Monday, November 1, 2021

Kyle Rittenhouse Trial Jury Selection

 Kyle Rittenhouse Trial: Jury Selection. 

Kyle has pleaded not guilty as he was acting in Self Defense. Which has been shown in numerous videos posted of the incident. We will see how this plays out.



In My opinion, I think the synopsis of Colion Noir was spot on in Aug of 2020 on the situation.







Friday, October 29, 2021

Representatives supporting Red Flag Law.

Representatives that vote for Red Flag laws are "Oath Breakers" betraying their constituents and blatantly going against the oath of office they swore to uphold. They believe they are above the law and the constitution. They look at their own self-interest before their constituents. 


This is too important to not call out. 

If you are a constituent under these representatives you need to find an alternate that supports your rights.

29  members of the house voted for a new Red Flag Bill helping it pass the house and on to the Senate
These people were willing to sell out our Constitutional Rights.
LIST OF REPS WHO VOTED YES
Dave Joyce - OH https://joyce.house.gov/
John Katko - NY https://katko.house.gov
Nicole Maliokatakis - NY https://malliotakis.house.gov/
Michael McCall - TX https://mccaul.house.gov/
Troy Balderson - OH https://balderson.house.gov/
Stephanie Vice - OK https://bice.house.gov/
Mike Bost - IL https://bost.house.gov/
John Carter - TX https://carter.house.gov/
 Rodney Davis - IL https://rodneydavis.house.gov/
 Mariannette Miller/Meeks - IA https://millermeeks.house.gov/
Markwayne Mullen - OK https://mullin.house.gov/
 Tom Reed - NY https://reed.house.gov/
 Mike Simpson - ID https://simpson.house.gov/
Pete Stauber - MN https://stauber.house.gov/
Mario Diaz-Balart - FL https://mariodiazbalart.house.gov/
Brian Fitzpatrick - PA https://fitzpatrick.house.gov/
Vicente Gonzalez -OH https://gonzalez.house.gov/
Darrell Issa - Ca https://issa.house.gov/
Bryan Steil - WI https://steil.house.gov/
Fred Upton - MI https://upton.house.gov/
David G.Validero - Ca https://valadao.house.gov/
Jefferson Van Drew - NJ https://vandrew.house.gov/
 
The Unorganized Militia under Title 10 section 246 B is the citizenry of the United States. Red Flag Laws are highly unconstitutional in multiple ways. All citizens must be ready to answer to the call of service to defend the people from enemies foreign and domestic. 

My Second Amendment page to the right goes into the purpose of the Second Amendment. Our Bill of Rights should never be questioned and if anything it should be expanded upon as a free nation. The Bill of Rights meant to put limits to federal power and to Guarantee undeniable rights to free people. 



Refer to the right column in regards to the 2nd Amendment Intent. 



 

Kyle Rittenhouse Self Defense Trial Updates. Kenosha Kid

 



Colion Noir AUG 2020 on information provided at that time before being scrubbed.
Live footage with commentary from Kyle himself.   





This is how FDA Approves Experimental Jab for 5 - 11 years old.

This is how FDA Approves Experimental Jab for 5 - 11 years old. They are using Children as Lab Rats and don't care


Experts conclude that children aren't threatened by COVID-19.

So why is the FDA about to approve Pfizer's emergency use authorization to vaccinate kids ages 5-11?

Especially when the long-term risks are unknown?



Fauci Bioterrorism Prosecution Needed